A wall will make us safe? This is the hot question these days in many European countries. And the problem is that the answer is often yes!
The European Union is going through one of the most difficult periods in its history. The ongoing eurozone crisis, still unresolved after nearly a decade, is now being compounded by the rise of nationalist movements; there’s risk that the Union may fall apart; and external and internal terrorism, not to mention the wars right on its doorstep.
Even more than the financial crisis that has been stalling capital and cash flow, the migration crisis (the worst in terms of population flows since WWII) appears to be the most destabilising issue because it has strongly reinforced the idea that, even when as a continent we are launching satellites into space and travelling with the help of virtual, three-dimensional mapping, European problems can be solved by building walls.
According to the International Organization for Migration, over one million migrants entered Europe by land or by sea in 2015. Greece and Italy faced the greatest pressure, owing to their extensive Mediterranean coastlines and crisis area vicinity. Over 50% of migrants arrived from Syria, 15% from Afghanistan, 6% from Eritrea and 4% from Iraq: all countries disrupted by conflicts, instability and dictatorships. Thus the political and humanitarian situation is compounding the usual economic motivation behind migration. So far, the EU response has been fragmentary and inadequate, based on national rather than community initiatives. In this climate of fear and bewilderment, we have witnessed the most absurd and obviously futile measures being taken: barbed wire fences, walls, ceilings to refugee numbers, outright refusals to accept refugee quotas and, ultimately, the reinstating of country borders.
If Schengen actually did collapse, the migrants at our borders would not bear the brunt of the blow (history teaches us that they will always find other ways). Instead, the very concept of Europe would be at risk, along with its many benefits: 2,800 billion euros per year in intra-European trade, almost 2 million cross-border workers, 24 million business travellers, 57 million road shipments, etc. According to a report by the think tank Bertelsmann Foundation, reinstating border controls would translate into an increase in costs and prices that would have a measurable negative impact on economic growth. If the price of goods imported from other European countries increased by 3% (a very conservative and therefore believable estimate) over the next ten years, the loss in GDP for the EU would amount to €1,400bn. Can we afford it? And more importantly, is this the Europe we’re striving for? So what should we do?
Even in this instance, we must distinguish between emergency measures and structural policies. Among the former, it would be logical to work on providing a common right to asylum policy that can be applied by all 28 member states, along with reception centres managed directly by the EU. This needs to be followed by a policy of redistribution and reallocation for settlement within EU countries (as has already been done, but this time without so much anxiety) in order to lessen the burden of the most exposed countries. We also need to create humanitarian corridors for those fleeing war and persecutions as well as develop a truly European border police to more effectively supervise the EU’s outer borders and help distinguish between refugees and economic migrants. Agreements along the lines of the one made with Turkey need to be reached or updated with other countries of origin, transit and first destination outside of the EU but, once again, without having to negotiate under emergency conditions.
But even all of this would not suffice. We need an actual European migration policy which includes foreign policy and international cooperation measures along with policies to back integration and communication with immigrant communities.
The United Nations has estimated that the African population will grow to three times its present figure by 2050. Thus the migratory pressure, over and above the numbers of refugees caused by wars, is bound to increase, and there can be no cutbacks on development cooperation and resources invested in the countries that fuel the flow of economic migrants. At the same time, our cities must be intelligently managed, and training and job access programs must be set up for refugees already in Europe in order to avoid migrant segregation and the risk that our suburbs will be turned into no-go areas. It is essential that communication campaigns be organised to highlight the positive aspects of the migratory phenomenon to the electorate. For example, in order to maintain current levels of production and welfare, the European workforce will require an estimated 250 million workers by 2060 and the acknowledged greater productivity of young migrants could increase the EU’s GDP by approximately 0.25% by 2020. If the migrants are allowed appropriate access to the job market and are not socially outcast and banished into suburban ghettoes, we will also avoid a whole range of security problems that European cities have had to deal with over the last decade. There are no simple solutions (other than the neo-Medieval populist narrative), but one fact emerges very clearly from this assessment: giving in to the re-nationalisation of our societies by reinstating autocratic behaviour will not enable us to face up to the challenges posed by a European integration project which could exploit the vast yet complex opportunities these unavoidable migratory flows entail.
More than a mere failure of European integration, we run the risk that Europe will lose its global role over the coming decades, faced with competition from giants such as China and India, with populations (and markets) of over a billion people.
A wall will make us safe? This is the hot question these days in many European countries. And the problem is that the answer is often yes!
