From Ankara to Brussels via Cyprus

Europe’s behaviour towards Turkey and its people cannot be ignored. Responsibilities are not all on one side of the fence.

* What was meant to be a historic step risks becoming a lost opportunity. Turkey’s road to European Union accession seems to be becoming more and more of an uphill climb. Yet does all the blame for these developments lie with Ankara? Rivers of ink have been poured into examinations of all of the attitudes, positions and doubts of the ‘Brussels club’ on the issue. But has anyone ever thought of approaching the situation from the other side, of putting themselves in the shoes of the Turks and of their government? I do not believe so, at least not with sufficient conviction.

Since 2003, the year in which negotiations were officially opened on paper, Turkey’s path towards accession has been encumbered with a succession of restraints, hopes, attempts at dialogue and admonishments that have come with such frequency that many, at least in Turkey, have begun to suspect that they were all just tactics employed in order to delay the moment of decision as much as possible. And we cannot blame them for being suspicious. One thing that has always profoundly bothered the Turkish people, and made them question Europe, was the lack of cohesion among EU member states. For instance, Italy’s consistent policies across various – and opposing – administrations earned it quite a bit of credibility. In this sense, Italy provided significant help by building excellent relations with Turkey – politically, economically and culturally. 

However, the same cannot be said of other nations, such as France, Holland, Austria and Germany, which have often been perceived as hostile towards Turkey’s ingress, as well as uninterested in pursuing mutual enrichment and Ankara’s proper integration into the EU. This occurred because the Brussels club was above all unable to come to terms with Ankara, and not simply because of religious differences.

Turkey’s ‘dowry’ comprises both great potential and a strategic position as well as a population of over 70 million people with an average age of 28, a demographic trend that runs counter to many countries on the Old Continent. If Turkey joined the EU, it would become its most populated state, with all of the problems that such a status would entail, from its importance in the European Union Parliament to the allocation of community funds that for some sectors, for example agriculture, would penalise other countries, including France. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Turkey’s road has been barred, or at least placed on a greater incline, because certain EU governments have been protecting their own national interests and because Ankara’s impact, along with all of its potential, would not exactly be painless.

Unfortunately, political decisions are often made on the basis of numbers and not people. And those who have suffered the consequences in this case are, above all, the Turkish people. While Brussels has continuously monitored Europeans’ opinions on the matter and debated endlessly on what effects Turkey’s entry or non-entry would have on Europe, the same operation was not carried out on the other side – that is, among the more than 70 million Turkish citizens. The most immediate by-product of this has been the development of a climate of mistrust among Turkish citizens of all things that fall under the heading “European Union Entry”.

Since 2003, the ruling moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has consistently polled its citizens to glean their attitudes on the accession process. Over time, those who were in favour have become increasingly opposed in varying percentages. However, the most interesting statistic is that even among those who support Ankara’s entry into the EU, the majority of people are also convinced that it will never happen. The reason cited, even during moments in which the Turkish government seemed to have abandoned negotiations, was significant disinterest from the Old Continent. In short: They don’t want us and don’t even want to tell us they don’t want us.

The consequences of this dynamic on a population such as Turkey’s, which has a significantly heightened sense of its national identity and has always felt it shared European values, were devastating. On the one hand, the feeling of rejection led to a truly closed stance toward Europe. On the other hand, it also led to a desire for selfaffirmation, which ultimately worked in the favour of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy about-turn towards the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

This process was helped in no small way by Turkey’s national press, which has historically had a nationalistic bent, and is always ready to portray Brussels’ requests as extortion, especially regarding issues such as Cyprus and EU entry requirements. However, it is no exaggeration to say that while the Turkish government at a certain point distanced itself from the European cause. And for its part, Europe, through its deeds and at times its words, has done nothing to show Turkey that it believes the latter to be an integral and important part of its project.

Brussels was rigid when it should have been more flexible. The EU closed its eyes before matters in which, precisely out of respect for European values, it should have intervened with force. The ‘Cyprus knot’ was used for years to essentially block the accession process. Turkey would never recognise the Greek part of the island, divided in two by Ankara’s military intervention of 1974, and the international community was not about to make any concessions over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognised practically only by the Turks.

A lack of political vision cast this stalemate not simply as an insurmountable obstacle but as a perfect excuse. Brussels also remained shamefully silent in the face of too many events that were glaring proof of Turkey’s profound internal problems and on which it should have instead been inflexible. Consider, for example, the persecution of writers and journalists, condemnations of the Turkish government by the Kurdish minority and fears over the weakening grip of domestic democracy. Even with regard to the Gezi Park protests when thousands, who had peacefully occupied the park to demonstrate for greater democracy, were subjected to brutality at the hands of the police, Brussels decided to intervene only days later and then merely with a statement.

Since 2010, probably partially due to his personal ambitions, Erdogan has been conducting an increasingly autonomous foreign policy that first sought out allies within the Muslim countries that were part of the Arab Spring and then an alliance with the Gulf monarchies. The latest act of independence was a degenerative one when, rather than entering the European Union, Ankara got itself involved in the war between Shia and Sunni Muslims and the fight within Sunni Islam itself.

The atrocious handling of the Syrian crisis and its ambiguous relationship with Islamic State (IS) have led to greater national instability in Turkey, which in its desire to play a bigger role in the regional balance risks losing its own. Proof of this lies in the tragic attacks in Suruç, Ankara and Istanbul. And beyond all of this, one inevitably wonders whether we would have a better response to international terrorism today had Turkey’s entry into the EU been handled differently.