Someone said that it is even too easy to blame Putin for everything happened in Ukraine in the last year. I think it was a way to say it is quite hard to deny that the way the Kremlin reacted to the crisis in Ukraine after the Euromaidan, and the war in Donbass that ensued, was nothing short of relaxed. But, at the same time, if it is too easy to find a scapegoat is too simplistic and reductive.
I want to try to do something that I have never done this blog: summarize in broad terms the Russian moves on the Ukrainian chessboard during the last year. At least, say, those above board or nearly so. And try, in hindsight, to put together some piece that may have been lost in the heat of the clash of opinions.
Association Agreement
Exactly one year ago, in November 2013, we were here to speculate on what Yanukovich would do on the eve of the summit with the EU in Vilnius. Not so much whether to sign or not to sign the Association Agreement, but how not to sign it. The EU offered the opportunity on a plate, conditioning the agreement to the release of Julja Tymoshenko. Yanukovych had always stated (formally rightly) that it was not within the powers of the president to change a court decision, and that the Rada was discussing a special law. The parliament wasn’t able to vote the bill (due to the abstention of the Communist Party and Yanukovych’s Party of Regions) and the process was suspended. In a last desperate attempt, Angela Merkel chided him in a rather non-diplomatic way. “We expected more from you,” she said during a meeting. Yanukovych, catched unprepared like schoolboy, dumped all the blame on Putin. “We have many problems with Moscow. I was left alone for three and a half years, in a very unequal position with Russia … one to one”, said joining his fists. Therefore, it is no secret that the Kremlin has made enormous pressure on all Eastern partners, but why was it effective with Yanukovich’s Ukraine and not – for instance – with and Moldova? Probably, not all depended on Moscow.
Crimea
I have written more than once how the annexation of Crimean was the international equivalent of a bag snatching. No need to say once again how it happened, it could be interesting to remember the excuses used. The version of Moscow is more or less this: there was a coup in Kiev, a strongly anti-Russian government was in, the population of Crimea felt threatened and sought the help of Russia. Now, once again, discuss the neo-Nazi threat and the urgency for a military intervention is like discussing UFOs. The point is that the real reasons would have justified the Russian intervention, at least through the cynical law of geopolitics. For no reason the Russian naval presence in the Black Sea could be put at risk. It is difficult to argue that if Ukraine joined NATO the Russian naval bases in the Crimea would be undermined. The Crimean one was a move or a countermove?
Donbass
Before escalating to a war, everything suggested the Donbass could become a second Crimea. The “little green men” appeared, along with some Chechen and Ossetian, and seized local government buildings. For some unfathomable reason, however, it did not end up like in Crimea. What we saw next, was the Anti-terror operation (Ato) launched by Kiev. I don’t mean that Ukrainians should thank Putin not to have caused a war in Crimea, but that they cannot blame only him for the war in Donbass. The ATO was launched by former acting president Turchynov, but almost nobody has noticed it until Poroshenko, once elected, gave orders to hurry. An army generally poorly trained and equipped, partly made up of battalions of paramilitary volunteers, is facing an equally shabby separatist militia. Old and inaccurate weapons, confusing orders and a slack chain of command are causing unnecessary deaths from both sides. On several occasions, then, there was the impression that the wires moved from Moscow not always worked properly, such as when Putin himself had asked the separatists of Donetsk and Lugansk to postpone the referendum on independence, or when some rebel commanders complained of not receiving enough support.
In short, if we want to blame somebody, we will be spoiled for choice.
Someone said that it is even too easy to blame Putin for everything happened in Ukraine in the last year. I think it was a way to say it is quite hard to deny that the way the Kremlin reacted to the crisis in Ukraine after the Euromaidan, and the war in Donbass that ensued, was nothing short of relaxed. But, at the same time, if it is too easy to find a scapegoat is too simplistic and reductive.
