Leading figures – Herman Van Rompuy: The past and future of Europe

The true responsibilities behind the Russian- Ukranian conflict revealed for the first time.

When Herman Van Rompuy was chosen as European Council president, many opinion makers referred to him as a “slow burner”. He probably was what Europe required in the midst of an extended and fearful crisis, a man of competence and resolve, whose approach counterbalanced that of a Commission president who (perhaps unavoidably) was devoted to compromise.

May I still call you president?

Since I received the title of emeritus, the answer is yes. 

Well, Mr. President, this is a difficult time for Europe. During the last six years, the integration process has faced one crisis after another: financial, social, economic, Greece, migrations, terrorism. National democracies no longer seem to select capable and far-sighted leaders. All mention of a federal union, probably the best solution, is being avoided.

The EU is the sum of 28 national democracies. When they are in trouble, Europe is in trouble. The democratic crisis came before the financial crisis. In 2002 Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front was already France’s secondlargest party. Ten years ago in my native Flanders, the most successful party was xenophobic and racist, just like Austria. The financial crisis has fanned these tendencies, but they were there all along. Our society is becoming increasingly individualistic, which leads to a fragmentation of the political landscape. In such a context, political leaders tend to pander to the mainstream, which is often populist. During the eurozone turmoil, we acted too little and too late because we had to wait until European and national interests coincided. We pulled through the euro crisis in the end, but it took two-and– a-half years. Hopefully with the refugee crisis, we’ll come to realise there’s no national solution a little sooner and that national protection measures only create problems and not solutions. We have to acknowledge we cannot achieve any lasting success unless we work together with other third-party countries such as Turkey and address issues outside our borders, as we are doing in Syria. We finally agreed on a common strategy in the March European Council. It will take time but it can succeed. Implementation is now key on the Turkish and the European side. Let’s hope that the peace talks in Geneva can help restore stability and IS (Islamic State) can be militarily defeated. This two-pronged approach is indispensable. It could stop migration and put an end to the human suffering of the poor Syrian people. Let us never forget this in the first instance is a humanitarian tragedy.

The management of these global crises is also hindered by the fact that most European leaders are constantly having to win over voters in separate general and regional elections and referendums. This rules out the kind of long-term policies that could turn out to be unpopular. During the Greek crisis, the German chancellor appeared to be waiting for election results in the Länder before announcing what might have been an unpopular decision. The EU should perhaps copy the US and hold European, national and even regional elections and referendums on the same day in order to stop this proliferation of elections that negatively affect efficient political action.

This is very true but that’s not the whole story. European policy now has a bearing on internal policies. It’s not just addressing the financial crisis and the migration issue; it also has an impact on people’s daily life. Up until a few years ago, Europe was still a generous win-win idea; it opened up markets and introduced creative policy making. Now it’s having to make choices; it’s reaching maturity. We are no longer a fledgling creation that can still be idealist and dream. We are part of the furniture now, having to deal with the tough reality of the financial world, the refugees and terrorism – all very tangible problems. We are victims of our own success. Our increasing integration now means we’re having to deal with the ‘Europeanization’ of internal politics. When I first heard the Finnish prime minister telling me, “I can’t approve that EU decision before our local elections in Finland,” I realised Europe had found its place in the hearts and minds of the electorate. A big, big difference. In the US, even with the one president and the one house of parliament, they’ve been without a budget for two years. The mid-term elections create a governance problem in the US, but constant electoral battles waged in the 28 EU countries do represent a problem for Europe.

In recent years people have begun to recognize the influence of European leaders! And that decisions reached in another country can affect their everyday life. European leaders even feature in satirical TV programs, which is very new and important, perhaps more important than changing the treaties.

I fully agree!

A word now about Brexit. When I was a young diplomat, in 1989, I was invited to an English castle to a debate on Europe. When I asked Ralph Dahrendorf why he thought the British were so Eurosceptic, he said it was because of their imperial history. Britain’s most pro-European factions were mainly interested in whether the EU actually worked and the possible advantages of membership rather than promoting its success. Things haven’t changed much since then, so might the Union be better off without the UK or should it be coaxed into remaining, despite the constraints Prime Minister David Cameron wishes to impose on its EU membership?

The UK already enjoys a special status. It has not joined the eurozone or the Schengen area. It won’t buy into the EU’s migration policy and the British are not European at heart. Even in foreign policy, in recent years, the UK’s contribution to the EU has been practically non-existent. It was hardly surprising that David Cameron was not in Minsk when (French President Francois) Hollande and (German Chancellor Angela) Merkel met with (Russian President Vladimir) Putin, even if he perhaps should have been. After all the UK has a seat on the Security Council, has a great diplomatic tradition and is a nuclear power. The only thing they want to take part in is the common market. The British have what one might call a ‘transactional view’ of Europe. I think the founding countries have a different view. For us, it’s about cooperation and peace, not so for the British. They only joined the EU in 1973 and staged a referendum about membership two years later. David Cameron is now calling for EU reform. Personally, I would not make his life more difficult than it is. I would call them reforms within the EU and not a reform of the EU. We must however do everything we can to ensure a positive outcome of this consultation. The agreement reached with the EU now means the British prime minister can campaign for the yes vote, which is no guarantee it will win but does improve its chances. The UK should stay in and not only for economic reasons. It is in their national interest. The UK out would amputate the EU. Our expanding Union would then become a shrinking club. My wish is that if the UK stays in the EU, the British will start to pull their weight much more than they have in the past, in foreign policy, in defence policy and more. Once the referendum is held a new chapter will begin. A referendum is not an opinion poll; it’s more like an election. In an opinion poll, one feels free to give one’s opinion, one can send a signal, but this vote will have serious consequences. We saw this in the Scottish referendum and in 1975. The opinion polls were negative and the final outcome was positive.

You mentioned EU foreign policy. What are your thoughts on the relationship with Russia? Some say it was a mistake to let Lithuania handle the relationship with Ukraine during their presidency. Lithuania is obsessed with its powerful neighbour and in the end the possibility of NATO accession plus EU Association was perceived as a provocation and the big bear reacted. Do you think Europe did everything it could to prevent Russia’s irrational reaction?

You could also turn the question around. Did Russia do all it could to improve relations with Europe?

Well, I took it for granted that the answer there was no. That’s why I asked a different question …
(Van Rompuy is clearly vexed by this issue)

First of all, the Lithuanian presidency was not decisive. It’s too easy to pin the blame on them. The Commission’s negotiations with the Ukrainian government were held with a Russian speaker from the east of the country, not with a pro-European person. I met him (Yanukovich, Ed.) many times. Until September 2013, he was very positive about the Association agreement and his being a Russian speaker gave us the impression we were not offending Russia. We were also meeting Putin or (Dmitrij) Medvedev twice a year at the same time. We had strategic meetings and they never once said, “We have a major problem: this is a red line and it should not be crossed”. Never! They might have had their reasons for this, perhaps they thought it would never happen … The member states decided to go ahead with the Association agreement in 2013 and together we decided to sign the Association in 2014. Let’s not blame the Lithuanians or anyone else. It was a collective decision. Of course, once the Maidan revolution started, the civil war spread and Putin made his move, taking advantage of the confusion to annex Crimea. This was a first turning point. The second was the crisis following the downing of the Malaysia Airlines MH 17: we clearly had to react. And we took the decision to apply economic sanctions. All 28 members, not just a few of us, all 28. Some were happier than others. Italy for example was not overjoyed, but all agreed. This step came after the civil war, after 9000 casualties, the annexation of Crimea and the MH 17 being shot down by Russian-sponsored rebels … The sanctions were not conceived as a form of punishment for Russia, but we felt that a rhetorical rebuff was too soft and military intervention was out of the question. We took this middle road to try and pressure Russia into seeking a resolution. And it resulted in the first and second Minsk agreements, which are not fully implemented yet. The rebels haven’t implemented what they promised, nor have the Ukrainians fully accomplished what they underwrote. The ceasefire is not fully respected but at least fewer people have been dying. I think this is how things actually went, and as always in such complex situations, allocating blame is anything but constructive. This being said, we’ve cooperated successfully with Russia on Iran and I hope we’ll continue to fight our common enemy in the Middle East: by which I mean IS. Remember what Putin said after the Paris attacks: “We will support our ally, France”. He used the word “ally”. We have common interests in the migration crisis and in the terrorism emergency. Together, we have to beat IS. Without the destruction of IS, there will be no peace in the Middle East or at home. But restoring a strategic partnership with Russia may only be possible when the Ukrainian issue is solved, that’s for sure!

In order to defeat IS, somebody has to put the famous ‘boots on the ground’ …

Not the Westerners! We’ve tried that. In Iraq and elsewhere, every time we’ve intervened, let’s face it, we’ve had little success.

Essentially we’ve never been able to deal with the post-war situation.

True, and the reason is probably because it has to involve many people. The Americans stayed in Iraq quite a long time after defeating and killing Saddam Hussein, but they had to deal with internal situations and that can be very difficult. In Libya we did take action. We actually destroyed the Gaddafi regime, and he was even killed. But we can hardly say it has been a success. In Italy you know what I mean: the coasts were better patrolled and protected before.

Maybe, when the EU will have a joint foreign and defence policy, we will be able to show we can do better than the Americans. I am certain we would be more skilled at handling the aftermath.

But then you have to spend more on defence. When France was heavily involved in the Libyan operation President Sarkozy told me, “We will do this without NATO”. We lasted one week then we had to call in NATO, which means the Americans. We didn’t have the means or the logistics to handle that kind of war on our own. And before speaking about a European defence, let’s try to spend more money and give priority to defence (even if the British won’t cooperate). First of all, we need some kind of acknowledgment that the area around the Mediterranean is our neighbourhood. How could we presume that those 4 million people – despite the war – would never move towards our coasts? Someone is now blaming the Greeks for their mismanagement of their borders, but they have received 800,000 migrants in 2015! How can their faltering economy be expected to manage such numbers without additional financial support? In my country, we are receiving 50 or 60,000 and it is already a big problem. We are ten million in Belgium, the same as is Greece, but they are receiving 15 times as many refugees. Can you imagine?

Thank you very much, especially for sharing your recollections on the Ukrainian crisis. Perhaps NATO should have had a different approach. I remember the public statements by NATO’s general secretary and Putin’s response before the Crimean invasion. Putin was very clear, saying, “We prefer to host a NATO delegation in Crimea rather than being hosted in Crimea by NATO”. The point was made. But that’s another story.

Yes, and deploying missiles in Poland was not necessary either; that was very close to a provocation in my opinion.

One last question. The four presidents report – which we might consider your political testament – will provide long-term inspiration. Do you think we will be able to accomplish some of your ideas? Should we be pessimistic or optimistic?

When I put the four presidents report on the table in June 2012, I never thought we would manage to implement the banking union so soon. This was a huge success and along with (European Central Bank President) Mario Draghi’s actions was the turning point in the crisis. Draghi told me recently that without the banking union framework he could never have engaged in quantitative easing. I was very satisfied but after the euro area’s recovery began, the appetite for implementing the rest was gone. I’m not sure whether putting the common deposit scheme as a first priority was a clever move. Though advisable, we knew in advance that Germany wouldn’t buy into it. I am even more pessimistic now because so long as the refugees crisis holds sway, the economic agenda is off the table. In October 2013, Germany and the Commission were pushing all member states to implement structural reforms (pensions, labour markets, etc.), in order to raise the overall level of competitiveness and prevent future crises in weaker countries that could easily spread to others. In Italy, (Enrico) Letta’s government and (Mario) Monti’s before that were very supportive, but most states said “no, this is threatening our sovereignty”. When I saw the sovereignty issues emerging, I realised the game was over.

So you agree with Jeanne Monnet’s statement “L’Europe se feradans les crises” ?

Definitely!

@GiuScognamiglio