Terrorism brews in the weaker states, where the citizens’ welfare and safety cannot be guaranteed.
”Ex Africa semper aliquidnovi”, wrote Pliny the Elder. Throughout history, Africa has been regarded as a continent of novelty, endemic phenomena that are barely intelligible from an external perspective and oddities (from the Big Five to pygmies imported to Europe for exhibition at fairs to aspects of tribalism considered exclusively African). The image of a “hopeless continent” (declared by The Economist in 2000) reinforced these stereotypes, relegating Africa to a borderland between history, magic and a certain kind of old-fashioned charm. It is therefore surprising that some of the phenomena that are troubling Western capital cities today – concerns about the fragility of the regimes that collapsed in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, terrorism, largescale migrations – had already emerged in Africa some decades ago. Taking a closer look to what happened on the African continent might help us imagine strategies for tackling these major global issues.
Although there is no internationally shared definition of fragile state, there is a general consensus on the definition provided by the OECD: “A state is fragile when it is unable or unwilling to perform the functions necessary for poverty reduction, the promotion of development, protection of the population and the observance of human rights”. The topic becomes especially relevant in the face of the threat of terrorism, since fragility, poverty and violence are closely interconnected phenomena. Fragile states, which fail to provide basic social, financial and legal assistance to the citizens and ensure public safety, offer a breeding ground for the escalation of conflicts and the emergence of terrorist groups.
Africa is home to a large percentage of fragile states which have become increasingly relevant from an international perspective due to transna tional phenomena such as migratory fluxes and the proliferating connections between African and Middle Eastern Islamic terrorism. A weak state presence and endemic corruption in countries such as Somalia, Mali, South Sudan and Nigeria, as well as the collapse or decline of regimes that opposed the most radical forms of Islam – as was the case in Libya – has allowed jihadists to expand their theatre of operations. In the countries of the Sahel belt, the outgrowth of the Arab Spring, starting with the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, aggravated a series of geopolitical dynamics that had already been at play for years, transforming the region into a catalyst for crisis amidst the disintegration of state entities, ever increasing migratory fluxes and terrorism. Nowadays, in addition to the traditional instability resulting from the difficult coexistence between populations identifying with the Arab-Islamic tradition in the north and partially Christianised black populations in the south, there is also a stronger presence of jihadist groups with increasing connections to other jihadist groups in the Middle East, mainly through Libya and Mali.
The cases of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria perfectly exemplify how radical jihadism sprouts and thrives in contexts marked by state failure. In spite of it being essentially a local terrorist organization, the destabilizing repercussions of Al- Shabaab’s activities, coupled with the constant flux of refugees, are making themselves felt throughout the whole region – especially in Ethiopia and Kenya – as well as globally. Rampant corruption and the unwillingness of the oligarchical power elites to ensure even the slightest redistribution of wealth has assisted in the development of the most violent form of jihadism on the international scene, Boko Haram. Since 2011, its terrorist activities have intensified, and this year, Boko Haram is second in the world, after IS, in the number of attacks it committed. According to Amnesty International, the group is responsible for the death of over 17,000 people, mostly civilians. Over the past few years, over one and a half million Nigerians have escaped to Niger, Cameroon and Chad, but Boko Haram is currently extending its operations into these countries as well. In the recent elections in Nigeria, the topic of fighting Boko Haram was at the heart of the political debate and partially determined its outcome. It is now time for the new president, Muhammud Buhari, to show that he took the election results seriously.
State fragility is the primary issue that needs to be addressed when facing issues related to conflicts, terrorism and migration. An international intervention is needed that combines cooperation and security in a strategy that is not merely reactionary but a long-term policy addressing the specific circumstances of the country in question.
African wars have numerous origins beyond Paul Collier’s grievance/greed dichotomy: religious wars, ethnic wars, wars between states, wars spurred by political conflict, secessionist wars and economic wars. Each conflict has its own causes and specific developments that are influenced by various factors.
The case of Somalia, where the intervention of regional powers is aimed at solving the conflict according to the mantra “African solutions to Africa’s problems’’, offers some valuable insight into the kind of strategies to be adopted when dealing with analogous conflict situations, starting with Libya. The involvement of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda in the Somali conflict has brought insecurity to these countries, exposing them to terrorist attacks or drawing them into a military intervention. While the pacification of some areas of the African continent can only be accomplished with the full involvement of local and regional actors, this must happen according to a clear framework shared by all international actors so as to avoid the breakout of proxy wars and attempts at establishing regional spheres of influence.
In addition to the serious involvement of regional actors, the fight against terrorism requires the strengthening of local institutions. They are the only ones that possess the legitimacy to conduct this kind of fight. The terrorist attacks in Bamako, the loss of territorial control in northern Mali as well as the recent attacks in Burkina Faso show how terrorist attacks or jihadist infiltrations can only be prevented in stable institutional contexts, where security forces are fully involved in controlling the territory. Security cooperation projects must keep this in mind and work to strengthen national institutions from within and ensure their loyalty to the national government plan.
Last but not least, we must take into account the way in which international aid efforts affect migration. The international economic crisis of these past few years and the conflicts that have arisen on other continents have led to a decrease in humanitarian aid that has penalised the most fragile states, encouraging domestic migration and emigration, mainly to Europe.
Security, strengthening institutions, increasing humanitarian aid: these are the points drawn from the African experience of the last 15 years that need to be on the international agenda in order to tackle pressing global issues.
Terrorism brews in the weaker states, where the citizens’ welfare and safety cannot be guaranteed.
