This week Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrein closed all diplomatic relations with Qatar. Within a few hours, these four countries were joined by Yemen and the Maldives. This is not just an interruption of diplomatic relations, as took place in 2014, but an actual geographic isolation of Qatar, that calls for the expulsion of all its citizens currently located in the participating countries, a stop to all air and sea traffic and the closure of all borders. According to the official motivation, the closing of relations is due to “support for terrorist activities” provided by Qatar to terrorists in the region. The accusation of “supporting terrorists” in actual fact means that the countries of the Gulf coalition want to bring Qatar back in line with Saudi politics, straining the power relations in the region.
There are a number of reasons for this:
1. Qatar has failed to fall in line with Saudi policies and has backed rebel formations in league with Iran.
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has been troublesome for some time now, owing to the traditional independence of Doha in the management of its own foreign policy, which is based on a differentiation principle in relation to its partners and tends not to be in step with that of the Saudis. The four countries that have broken off relations with Qatar are accusing the small and extremely rich Gulf country of backing rebel formations close to Iran: in Egypt, for example, Doha has for years been funding members of the Muslim Brotherhood of the deposed President Mohamed Morsi, considered terrorists in their own country. In Yemen, on the other hand, the Yemeni government backed by the Saudis has been fighting a long-drawn out civil war against the Shiite Houthi rebels, backed by Tehran. Finally, Sunni led Bahrein fear Iran may incite its majority Shiite population to revolt.
2. Different views on Islamic politics.
There is also a substantial difference in how Qatar and the other Gulf states approach Islamic politics. Though they all belong to the same Sunni front, Qatar supports the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in the Gaza Strip (also close to the Brotherhood), while Saudi Arabia stands as a point of reference for Wahhabism and Salafism. Close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood are seriously frowned upon both in Riyadh and Cairo. Hardly surprisingly in 2014, as a result of this different approach, when Qatar and Turkey offered support for Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrein decided to recall their ambassadors from Doha.
3. Shared interests between Qatar and Iran.
Another reason for the clash between the Gulf countries and Qatar is related to the good relations between Doha and Tehran, due to their shared exploitation of the largest natural gas field in the world, the South Pars/North Dome field, that has enabled Qatar to become the third largest producer of natural gas in the world and the first exporter of liquid natural gas. The two countries cooperate because both extract over 2/3 of their national gas production from this field.
4. Trump and the newfound brawn of the Sunni front.
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia has been viewed by the Gulf countries not just as a new American commitment in favour of the Sunnis, but also a sort of green light for all initiatives designed to thwart Shiite expansion within the region.
What are the possible consequences?
Qatar, considering the power relations with other Arab countries in the area, may be forced to give in to the pressure of the Gulf states, but the complexity of the issues involved in this crisis make it difficult to make sound predictions. Here are some possible consequences:
1. The main repercussions will be on an economic level. Following the announcement, the index of the Qatari stock exchange dropped by more than 7%. With a sovereign fund of 340 billion dollars and a trade surplus of 2.7 billion dollars, Qatar has plenty of resources at its disposal to hold out against this isolation. However, if the crisis should persist, one cannot rule out consequences in terms of trade contracts and investments. (It’s worth remembering Qatar’s extensive foreign investments that involve real estate, mass retail, fashion, banks – examples here are the refurbishing of the area around the Garibaldi Station in Milan, its share in Meridiana and their acquisition of Valentino, their quotas of Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and Barclays, their interest in Volkswagen, Tiffany’s, in the English Sainsbury’s supermarket chain and Rosneft, the Russian oil company, plus their ownership of the French football club Paris Saint-Germain).
2. Besides the economic aspect, there would also be repercussions in terms of image and to the organisation of the 2022 Football World Championships.
Finally, if one looks at the regional geopolitical picture, it is conceivable this will lead to a consolidation of a strong Saudi led block. Russia has not yet picked sides, so it can act as a mediator at a later date. Doha could hope for support from Turkey, traditionally close to the Muslim Brotherhood and currently in good standing with the Russians.
@GiuScognamiglio