Western Kurdistan works on an experiment in democratic autonomy on the seething border between Syria, Iraq and Turkey.
With the end of French colonisation (in 1943), the Syrian Kurds in the provinces of Jazira, Afrin and Kobani were cut off from Kurdistan and deprived of formal representation in the state most permeated with Arab nationalism.
As a result of the 1962 Hasaka census, thousands of Syrian Kurds were deprived of citizenship. Stateless Kurds reaped no benefits from the agrarian reform and were denied access to the labour market.
The local tribal leaders saw the political parties as a tool to promote their own interests. Fractured and in league with the secret services, the Kurdish groups did not start organising demonstrations until after the 2004 Qamishli massacre.
The election of Masoud Barzani as president of Iraqi Kurdistan in 2005 and US support for the Iraqi peshmerga since 2003 spurred the Syrian Kurds into action.
The main Syrian Kurdish party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), was established in 2003 and structured like a communist party. The PYD’S ideological leader, Abdullah Öcalan, lived in Syrian Kurdistan from 1980 to 1998, tolerated by the Hafez al-Assad government.
When Bashar al-Assad rose to power in 2000, a brief period of reconciliation saw Syria’s frag- W mented oppositions join forces, along with Kurdish movements. On the eve of the 2011 revolts, the concessions granted by al-Assad were primarily in favour of the Kurdish parties, which is how many stateless Kurds obtained citizenship rights.
However, the fear that the Muslim Brotherhood might take over the Syrian opposition forces led to the formation of the National Kurdish Council (KNC). The PYD refused to join the Council and began putting Öcalan’s theories of autonomous democracy into practice, setting up selfdefence groups and organising its own militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).
From then on, the ‘republic’ of Rojava, in northwestern Syria, has embodied Öcalan’s principles. Popular assemblies were set up. Local councils were instituted with attention paid to ethnic representation. Each municipality has three leaders: a Kurd, an Arab and an Assyrian or Armenian Christian, and one of the three must be a woman.
This was made possible by the alliance between Öcalan’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish Syrians of the PYD. The PKK has worked towards creating free, self-governed communities based on the principle of direct democracy. According to militants, the Kurds are fighting to provide a global model for a democratic Middle East rather than their own independent state.
Harriet Allsopp, lecturer at Birkbeck College, University of London and author of the book The Kurds of Syria, explains how the PYD has countered the advance of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and freed the city of Kobane: “The YPG’s, composed mainly of women and young people, have protected the Kurdish areas and view the war against IS as a way of securing international legitimization”.
There are close ties between the Kurds in Öcalan’s party and the Syrian Kurds, while relations with the Iraqi Kurds are problematic. “This reflects the rivalry between Öcalan and Masoud Barzani. Barzani has excellent relations with the Turkish government and has never been in favour of the independence of the Syrian PYD. Yet Öcalan and Masoud Barzani have joined forces against IS – an unprecedented event in Kurdish history. Yet Barzani remains a neo-liberal and the composition of his party mirrors traditional tribal divisions while Öcalan’s party (PKK) and the Syrian PYD are ideological parties”, according to the British scholar.
The real enemy of Syrian Kurds is the Turkish government. “The Turkish government is not prepared to arm the Syrian Kurds due to their close relations with Öcalan’s party. Backing them would mean strengthening the PKK. If the Turkish government in the past has supported the Free Syrian Army against President Bashar al-Assad, and indirectly the Syrian Kurds, this is no longer possible because it would be indirectly fuelling the claims for independence of Turkish Kurds”, says Allsopp.
In 2015 there could be a referendum on Kurdish independence in Iraq, but the birth of a Kurdish state still seems a long way off and would in any case not include Syrian Kurdistan. “The Israelis support the independence of Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi Kurdistan is stable, non-denominational and a good ally of the West. While a confederation between Syrian Kurds and Barzani would be against Western interests”, concludes Allsopp.
Since the 2011 revolts, the Syrian Kurds of the PYD have stood out for their independence from both al-Assad’s government and the fragmented opposition, as they fight for autonomy.
The Arab opposition forces reject the Kurdish claims and have openly accused the Syrian Kurds of siding with al-Assad against the Free Syrian Army, while Syrian Kurds accuse the anti-Assad militias of being in league with Turkey.
The Kurdish fighters despite internal rivalries have proven very effective in the fight against IS in Syria and Iraq. Yet the path towards full acceptance of their right to self-government still looks a very long and arduous one.
Western Kurdistan works on an experiment in democratic autonomy on the seething border between Syria, Iraq and Turkey.
With the end of French colonisation (in 1943), the Syrian Kurds in the provinces of Jazira, Afrin and Kobani were cut off from Kurdistan and deprived of formal representation in the state most permeated with Arab nationalism.
