Putin visited Greece and Lavrov was in Hungary, two of the EU countries most hostile to the sanctions, while the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier said it’s time to soften them. Meanwhile Junker has already announced its presence at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg in mid June.
Soon Europe will have to decide whether to renew the sanctions imposed on Russia for the war in Ukraine or not. And maneuvers by Russia and some European countries to prevent it from extending are not even so discrete. The “pro-Russian” front among EU members seems to be more compact and resolved to vote against it, but also among the countries usually less well-disposed toward Moscow the topiv begins to be worn-out. Germany, for example, is not just among the European countries most hostile to Putin, but it is definitely among those that have so far maintained a strict and constant position. But two days ago the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has spoken in favor of a, albeit gradual, reduction of the sanctions against Russia “if Moscow fulfills its obligations under the peace agreements”. The German position seems to be the same as the last two years, but actually hides a softening. “I hope that by the end of June there will be progress and then we can see if we can reduce the sanctions step by step. If there is no progress, an evaluation will also be necessary”, said Steinmeier before adding that “It is not our aim to maintain the sanctions but to resolve the conflict“. And it is in this apparent consistency that hides the Minsk trap.
The mire of Minsk agreements
The Minsk agreements are an alibi. Linking the sanctions to the peace process started when the conflict was at its highest is the best gift that Europe can make to Putin for his misdeeds in Ukraine. A dozen points agreed already more than a year ago are a mire in which Ukraine found itself embroiled because of its weak position both on the military and on the international level. Using them as a parameter means not to take into account all aspects of Russian military aggression on Ukraine that are not mentioned in the agreement. Such as the use of regular army, the secret supply of weapons to the separatists and the seizing and incarceration of Ukrainian citizens in Crimea and the Donbass, not to mention all the damages already caused and the destabilization of the entire region for the years to come.
Steinmeier tells the true when he says that their aim is not to maintain the sanctions but to resolve the conflict. One might add that the Ukraine’s European partners are not interested in restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine nor in repairing the damage caused by Russia to the status quo that ruled the continent during the last 70 years. All they care about is finding a pretext to not lose face, get rid of the sanctions and return to do business even more than before. How to explain otherwise the awkward silence on the military occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea?
The double trap that lurks behind the Minsk agreements also includes the fact that not mentioning the Crimea risks to accept once and for all the forced annexation by Russia, which is already happening before our eyes. It is likely to be, in short, a kind of de facto recognition.
Yet, the sanctions should be maintained and indeed strengthened, because their effectiveness is even wider in the medium term. Because they are the only real weapon in the hands of Europe and the US to force Russia to change its strategy in Ukraine, to push it to let go the Donbass, and even compensate for the Crimea. Because if a return of the peninsula to Ukraine is not even thinkable, it does not mean that it should not even be assumed a form of reparation.
It is always better trying than ignoring it.
@daniloeliatweet
Putin visited Greece and Lavrov was in Hungary, two of the EU countries most hostile to the sanctions, while the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier said it’s time to soften them. Meanwhile Junker has already announced its presence at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg in mid June.