The Sultanate of Oman survives and prospers by keeping its doors open.
There’s no need to enter the Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque to appreciate its interior decor. Its large doors are kept wide open and all passersby in the vibrant Ruwi neighbourhood can visually take part in the prayer, not just through the call of the muezzin.
The mosque is located in the heart of downtown Muscat, next to Oman’s largest Indo-Pakistani souq and close to a number of churches and Hindu temples. In Oman this ‘open-door policy’ is by no means an exception: it applies throughout the country and is just as common in the highly populated coastal cities as it is in the inland desert regions. “Here, we pray all together,” says Naser, interrupting his taxi shift to attend the mosque for afternoon prayers.
While tensions between the different branches of Islam have been peaking throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East, Oman continues to uphold its traditional liberal stance.
“For us, the Shia and the Sunni are our brothers,” adds Naser as he drives his cab along the Muscat beachfront, passing umbrellas and the occasional swimsuit-clad Westerner.
Actually, from a theological point of view Oman’s ‘soft’ Islam, known as Ibadism, has more in common with Sunni Islam than Shia doctrine, since it recognises the spiritual guidance of the most worthy rather than the descendents of Mohammed (the cornerstone of the Shia faith). But this has never prevented Oman from developing close ties with neighbouring Shia Iran while always keeping an open dialogue with the various Sunni tendencies in the Arabian Peninsula, including the most conservative forms such as Saudi Wahhabism.
As the only country in the world with a majority population of the Ibadi faith, Oman’s ‘third way’ has become its raison d’etre and the country has always stood out for its pragmatism and tolerance.
Ibadism developed a few years after the death of Mohammed, making it one of the most ancient Muslim doctrines. The Ibadi faith looks upon Muslims of differing creeds with moderation, considering them ‘ungrateful’ rather than infidels. Violence is never professed for religious reasons and mixed marriages with Muslims of other denominations are allowed. Ibadism has always demonstrated a notable openness to non-Muslims as well. “The Ibadis are the least fanatic and sectarian of all Muslims and openly associate with people of all faiths and pray together with Sunni Muslims,” writes Valerie Hoffman, a professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Illinois, relating comments made by 19th century British visitors to the then empire of Oman, which extended from Zanzibar in East Africa to the Indian coastal state of Gujarat.
Along with their tolerance, the Ibadi are also famed for their business sense, which is partly dictated by Oman’s location astride the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The result is a multiethnic country with an Arab population often mixed or descendants of its former colonies in Africa and India, with the addition of recent immigrants from Pakistan, India, the Philippines and Bangladesh which now represent at least onethird of the country’s inhabitants.
In terms of foreign policy, Ibadism fosters a constant search for mediation with the countries in the area. Oman is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional intergovernmental political and economic union, under the de facto leadership of Saudi Arabia, which brings together the oil mongering emirs and Sunni monarchs of the Eastern Arabian Peninsula.
But Oman is also the main regional partner of Iran, Riyadh’s long-time archenemy. It is widely acknowledged that the sultan of Oman, Qaboos bin Said al Said, has played a key role in thawing relations between Iran and the United States towards a nuclear accord. Oman was also the first country to explicitly counter Saudi pressure to steer the GCC onto a more military and anti-Iranian tack.
Trade always prospers with peace, a concept well understood in Oman as its immediate reward for services offered to Tehran will be the construction of a gas pipeline between the two countries. Oman will obtain gas at a competitive price, enabling the country to compensate for the gradual decline of its own reserves, while Iran will gain a partner to buy its hydrocarbons, or to act as an intermediary for third-party sales, in the face of the Western embargo.
It is clear, however, that Omani policy is very delicately poised. As the Shia revolts in Yemen and Bahrain and the increasingly sectarian wars in Iraq and Syria have shown, the risk of falling victim to fratricidal conflict is high. The problem would not appear to be immediate, but with the sultan in his mid-seventies and without an heir, the future is uncertain.
The traditional Ibadi system establishes the semi-democratic appointment of the leader (imam) by the foremost Islamic jurists and tribal heads, but the former sultan, Qaboos’ father Said bin Taimur, put the dampeners on the ancient Ibadi tradition during the 1950s when he led the country towards a dynastic system of leadership under a sultan with absolute powers. During his 45-year reign, Qaboos has introduced a semblance of democratic institutions, although they still lack genuine powers or legitimacy.
In spite of its peaceful traditions, without a designated leader and with oil resources on the wane, the post-Qaboos sultanate could fall prey to instability or worse – civil conflict. Unfortunately these kinds of things too have happened in Oman’s long history.
The Sultanate of Oman survives and prospers by keeping its doors open.
