Turkey and Egypt: the path to rapprochement

In recent months diplomatic efforts between Egypt and Turkey have intensified. The diplomatic push are the Abraham Accords and the new Biden Administration

In recent months diplomatic efforts between Egypt and Turkey have intensified. Their necessity to de-escalate their relations is the consequence of geopolitical transformations in the MENA region.

Economically, Egypt and Turkey can hardly be considered adversaries since a 2005 trade agreement, Cairo has become Ankara’s largest trade partner in Africa. But politically, diplomatic relations were severed when in 2013, democratically elected Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi was ousted after the coup d’etat led by then minister of defence Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Morsi was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist international organization that in the past has been greatly supported by Ankara. As Egypt’s secular government considers the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, Turkey’s support contributes to the ideological gap that divides Ankara and Cairo. The contention between the two reached its zenith in Libya, which became the theatre for a proxy war. Erdogan is militarily supporting the UN-recognized Government of National Accord, and al-Sisi is oppositely supporting renegade General Khalifa Haftar.

Nonetheless, since February of this year, diplomatic intercourse between Turkey and Egypt has gained strength. In February, Egypt announced a new exploration bid for gas and oil in the Eastern Mediterranean; in doing so, Cairo recognized Turkey’s continental shelf’s coordinates, a move which was positively interpreted by Ankara. During The following month, Turkish government officials have reportedly asked Egyptian opposition tv channels present in Turkey to scale down their anti-al-Sisi rhetoric. Egyptian reception of Turkey’s openings was initially cold, but in the first days of May the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two nations met in Cairo to discuss the normalization of diplomatic relations.

This diplomatic push – which comes mainly from Turkey – is the consequence of global and regional transformations that progressively isolated Ankara. Firstly, the Abraham Accords tightened the relation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, two regional competitors of Turkey, the latter of which, thanks to the Accords, will be able to pursue its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, most likely cooperating with Greece and Cyprus. Additionally, the new Biden Administration has been less permissive towards Turkey compared to its predecessor in regard to human rights violations and relations with Russia. And finally, when the Gulf Cooperation Council decided to reconcile with Qatar, it pushed Doha – the main ally of Turkey in the region – to reopen relations with Cairo. If, to these shifts, we add the exclusion of Turkey from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum initiatives, it makes sense for Ankara to try and reconcile with its neighbours. Turkish diplomats and government officials have, in fact, also met with counterparts from Riyadh and Athens to normalize historically conflictual relationships; even more so after the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in Turkey, and after the Greek-Turkish frictions in the Aegean Sea.

Egypt, on the other side, has been less prone to restart diplomatic efforts with Turkey, so much so that in March, Cairo publicly denied a resumption of diplomatic ties with Ankara. Egypt insists that for that to happen, Turkey will first need to pull its troops out of Libya. The Libyan theatre is of vital interest to Egypt, as if it was to become home to an Islamist regime aligned with Ankara, it would be a major threat to Cairo. But as for Turkey, regional developments have pushed al-Sisi’s government to reevaluate its foreign policy strategy towards more conciliatory terms. In light of the military successes of the GNA, Egypt has started to view its player of choice – General Khalifa Haftar – as a burden more than anything. It could be evaluating the possibility of a political solution to the Libyan conflict, as the Turkish-Egyptian summit of May might suggest. Furthermore, considering the normalization that Turkey is conducting with Egyptian partners such as Greece, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, it would be problematic for Cairo to maintain an anti-Turkish stance.

The path to rapprochement won’t be easy though. Other regional players have interest in spoiling Egyptian-Turkish relations, especially in the energy sector, since a cooperation between the two could put both Ankara and Cairo on the way to become regional gas hubs. Moreover other regional dossiers remain open for the two to settle. While interests might be converging in Libya, putting concrete efforts in rebuilding the country could present new reasons for conflict. And to its south, Egypt is managing a dispute over the GERD Dam, which is being built in Ethiopia and which would jeopardize Egyptian access to the water coming from the Nile. Ankara is currently improving its relations with Ethiopia so as to consolidate its power in the Horn of Africa, and this too risks to become a reason to pull the brakes on the diplomatic endeavor between Egypt and Turkey.