Climate alert

The Sahel is the ground zero of climate change: drought, desertification and 150 million inhabitants. Rainfall is so scarce that Lake Chad has shrunk by 90%.

The impact of climate change on human mobility has for some time now taken on a central role in the narrative concerning migrations. The reason is simple and hinges on a number: 143 million. These are the people who by 2050 will be forced to embark on more or less extensive relocations to avoid the effects of global warming. We’re talking about 4% of the world’s population concentrated in the areas more at risk, spread throughout Asia, South America and Africa. These figures were provided by a study published by the World Bank that now stands alongside many other research papers that point to the urgent need to face up to the realities of climate change, beginning with its impact on migrations.

Hardly surprisingly the areas that are worst hit by the “climate and migration” dichotomy are also the poorest, most backward, densely populated and politically unstable areas of the world. They are often war zones, where most of the world’s population is vying for vital resources available in limited and ever decreasing amounts. They are also areas where corruption and the absence of efficient forms of government hinder strategic management and development plans, starting with the identification of guidelines to help the social inclusion of those who for the sake of simplicity we will refer to as “climate migrants”. It goes without saying that migrations triggered only by environmental issues do not exist, except for occasional violent storms, flooding or extreme droughts, instances in which forced relocations are limited in time and are generally followed by the return to the places of origin once the events have abated. However, in actual fact the effects of climate change worsen pre-existing conditions such as wars, poverty, food shortages and political instability, accelerating migratory phenomena which, contrary to general beliefs, are for the most part (80%) regional.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, over the course of the next thirty years, 86 million inhabitants will have to come to terms with the impact of global warming, with repercussions on the economy and social equality. Included in this vast strip of Sub-Saharan territories, the Sahel is identified as the Ground Zero of climate change. This is an area stretching over 2.5 million square kilometres located south of the Sahara that runs from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and encompasses Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Here, 150 million people live in a context of endemic instability, worsened and often triggered by extreme heat, droughts and desertification, the main long term effects suffered by Sahel countries where in 2017, though with regional differences, it rained between 15 and 50% less compared to 2016.

This was not exception, just a confirmation of a long-standing state of affairs. Proof of this is provided by Lake Chad, whose surface area over the last 50 years has decreased by 90%, forcing entire farming and cattle raising communities to migrate to the cities of Lagos, Kano and Abuja in Nigeria, increasing the anthropic pressure on these centres. Relocations that are made more complicated by the instability caused by Boko Haram, which in 2014 was the most lethal terrorist organisation in the world, totting up 7,512 victims in Nigeria alone, while carrying out actions also in Chad, Cameroon and Niger.

Then there’s the heat. If the temperature in Sahel increases by 1.5 °C during the hot season human survival will no longer be possible. This is according to the International Organisation for Migrations (IOM), and the urgency of the situation is included in the minimum target set by the Paris Conference on Climate: limiting the average temperature increase to 2°C by the end of the century. This means that in the Sahel there will be between 30 and 60 million people at risk of forced exodus. One hundred million if the temperature rises by 2°C, with a billion people involved at a global level. Extreme heat means temperatures above 46°C, considering that in the 37 to 45°C temperature range a human can withstand four hours of exposure. Resulting in a 30% reduction in work efficiency, thus lower productivity, more poverty and a wider gap with temperate areas. This is particularly true in the Sahel, where the worst hit will be the subsistence farmers and shepherds, sectors which currently includes 60% of the active labour force.

In spite of the chronic drought and desertification, Sahel also suffers from devastating floods. In 2012, the rainy season left behind it entire villages reduced to rubble, including settlements of refugees who had previously fled from regional conflicts. In Nigeria alone, in just a few weeks, 6.1 million people abandoned IDP camps and villages, further complicating internal stability. To get a better idea of what we’re talking about, suffice it to say that the Nigerian exodus is equivalent to three times the migrations faced by the 28 EU countries between 2014 and 2017 (1,766,186 landings by sea, source UNHCR). But there are more internally displaced in Mali who, after escaping a devastating food crisis and a cholera epidemic, joined 500,000 Niger flood victims. Half a million people were also involved in Chad, where the isolation of vast areas has hindered the distribution of humanitarian aid to the IDP camps of those fleeing from regional conflicts.

This explains the need to look at the climate migrations in the Sahel from a broader perspective, tying them in to the geopolitical context in which they take place. Thus instability, conflicts and environmental disasters are mingled with more long-term effects such as the rise in temperature, the loss of biodiversity, desertification, soil impermeabilization and salinisation, pollution and water shortages. Conditions that only worsen poverty, weaken governments, undermine infrastructure in areas with an increasing demographic and the highest levels of dependency, meaning the working population that is not in a position to guarantee its own survival. Extreme climate conditions can ultimately be the root cause of many conflicts, thus heightening existing stress levels, such as the distribution and access to natural resources, capital, education and the distribution of aid and, last but not least, limitations to the rule of law.

The tangible effects of all these factors have been analysed by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat in its “Before the Desert” report. Today, there are 24 million people in the Sahel who cannot survive without external aid, 10.8 million who suffer from food insecurity, 4.7 million undernourished children and 500,000 seriously so, while 5 million minors have no access to continuous education. The internally displaced amount to 2.1 million, including 919,000 refugees. Besides the outgoing migration flows, there are also 2.1 million attempting to return, while in Burkina Faso 790,000 people need assistance, along with 4.1 million in Mali, 2.3 million in Niger, 4.4 million in Chad and 7.7 million in Nigeria.

In this highly mobile context, those departing leave behind a land with compromised productivity, or so unstable to make access to resources or the exploitation of pastures historically used for grazing impossible. Migration becomes a survival strategy and in most cases, the destination is some place nearby, often within national borders, or just a little further, providing it is culturally compatible, where the social and economic conditions they previously relied on can be recreated. The choice of where to migrate is not linear, but is assessed taking into account wars and ethnic or religious disputes. Thus the regional geopolitical balance risks narrowing the choices, undermining the initial condition: drought vs rainfall.

Eighty percent of exoduses from the Sahel are contained within the area, using Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso as key passages. Migrations follow the paths of caravan routes or the traditional paths travelled by shepherds moving their flock to better pastures, a testimony of previous strategies of climate adaptation. Movements that were facilitated by the introduction of the ECOWAS passport in Sahel and West Africa which allows the free circulation of holders, an essential requirement in order to seek job opportunities and resist extreme climate conditions. However, the ECOWAS agreements doesn’t eliminate the corruption of border guards at the key crossroads or reduce the likelihood of molestation along the transit routes. Conditions that get worse as political instability increases, as is the case in Nigeria, where the effects of climate change have contributed to the 2.1 million internally displaced caused by the conflict, to which one has to add 200,00 refugees from nearby countries. Clashes and violence are at the root of the clashes on the border between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, to which one has to add the chronic instability of the Lake Chad basin.

But why doesn’t the majority of climate migrants head for Europe? The priority of most of those fleeing is survival, and this means using all available assets: money, belongings, living livestock and property. But paying the border guards, bribing the authorities and successfully negotiating the long journey across the Sahara that leads to the Mediterranean coasts is a luxury few can afford. The money is needed for food, for water, for a shelter or to pay the price of protection. This explains why 70% of the migrants who reach Italy by sea are male. Crossing the desert on foot and little water requires an above average level of physical conditioning. Plus, the richer families forced to move from one country to the next seeking safety can only afford to pay for one person to make the journey. Therefore it’s usually a man because they have more of a chance of finding work in Europe.

The migration of tens of millions of people in the heart of Africa would have dramatic repercussions on a regional level. We just have to look to our own patch to take stock of the fact. Despite being rich, democratic, politically stable and apparently capable of moderating migratory flows, in the last four years the EU has paid a heavy price for its inability to politically cater for these exoduses. So what would happen if a ten or fifty times the number of internally displaced increases social pressures in Sub-Saharan Africa? It goes without saying that it’s up to the more developed countries to try and mitigate the impact of climate migrations, but there must be a political will to do so, starting with the reduction of greenhouse gases, which contribute to global warming. However, this issue continues to be discussed in terms that are to say the least unreasonable. The most blatant example is provided by United States President Donald Trump, who true to his campaign promise is opting out of the Paris Accord, signed by Barack Obama on behalf of the United States in December 2015. Learning from one’s mistakes is proof of wisdom, on condition that one does so right away. In Sahel and Africa time is a depleted resource, as is water.

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