Andrea Colombo

Brazil, Lula might be back. Will his foreign policy be different?

La Redazione

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24 October 2022

Brazil, Lula might be back. Will his foreign policy be different?

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It is highly likely that Lula will cooperate with the US on issues such as climate change and democracy-building, without neglecting the trade and financial benefits he might receive from China

After the last accusation on corruption, out of twenty-five others, has been overturned by Brazil’s Supreme Court for procedural reasons, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is back. The PT leader has since then been on a swift run to get the presidency back from his political nemesis: Jair Bolsonaro. In the last election, Lula was not able to challenge him given that he was jailed and prohibited to run, although he was later freed pending appeal.

His positioning on domestic issues such as social policies and deforestation will most likely be similar to his past two mandates, as some of his recent statements show. Considering the deep changes in the regional and international context though, it will be interesting to see if there will be any changes in the domain of foreign policy.

Lula’s previous foreign policy position

Recalling all the steps Brazil took in its foreign policy with Lula during his two mandates, from 2002 up to 2010, is a challenging task. At the beginning of the century, Brazil was regarded as one of the most promising up and coming developing countries, generating investments and high hopes. “This is my man, right here. I love this guy, the most popular politician on Earth” were the words president Obama used to describe Lula during a G20 Summit in London.

At the same time, Brazil had the clear ambition to become a regional leader through integration initiatives like the CELAC and UNASUR, to which Lula contributed substantially. This aspiration materialized only at certain times, with some positive moments of advancement such as the successful participation of Brazil in the multilateral meetings of the G20 and some others of frustration, as the inability to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In any case, the sensation in the first decade of the century was that Brazil was all over the place. Today, following Bolsonaro’s inactivity in foreign policy and the numerous domestic challenges the country faces, its projection as a leader is fading.

A balanced relation between the BRICS and the US

When analyzing Brazil’s foreign affairs, it’s impossible not to associate Lula’s name to the BRICS. The acronym stands for a list of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), that represented the five major developing countries at the beginning of the century. These countries had the common ambition to amplify their voices in international affairs, and Lula’s Brazil was one of the most prominent members.

The BRICS reached some important achievements such as the creation of new financial institutions alternative to the conventional system composed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). After a few years though, frictions between India and China started to threaten the stability of the block, and a stalemate was reached in its development following the change in presidencies of the members. Even if Lula wins, the isolation of Russia triggered by its aggression of Ukraine will further hamper the possibility of advancements in the bloc’s integration.

Despite the positive relation with the BRICS, which comprehended Russia and China, Brazil was able to forge a constructive bilateral partnership with the US as well, as demonstrated by Obama’s words quoted above. Even if most of Lula’s foreign efforts were devoted to the so-called ‘South-South cooperation’, he was able to forge a partnership with the US based around strategic issues, one of which was the entente on biofuels with the Bush government. With President Obama, the political affinity was higher than with Bush and cooperation followed, although Brazil formed part of the first pink tide that comprehended major enemies of the US such as the Venezuela of Hugo Chavez. Obama and Lula met multiple times in the framework of the G20 meetings, and coordination was sought to respond to global and hemispheric crises such as the financial crisis of 2008.

On to another pink tide?

With the coming to power of different left-leaning leaders in the region, a debate has started on whether a “new pink tide” is now spreading across Latin America. If Lula is elected, the seven largest economies of the region will be led by leftist heads of state. Yet, the difference among these leaders is so profound that their election has been defined more as an “anti-incumbent” tendency, rather than a new tide.

First, there is the difference between democratically elected leaders and the three dictatorships of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric, has been brave enough to distance himself clearly from these regimes and has condemned the human rights violations taking place in those territories, something that must not be taken for granted. One of the most interesting developments to keep an eye on will be how Lula will choose to position Brazil in front of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. In the past, he had forged ties with them, although the human rights situation had not deteriorated as much as it has in the second half of the 2010s, especially regarding Venezuela and Nicaragua. Lula’s position towards the left dictatorships might represent a strong source of friction with the US.

Nevertheless, there have already been talks of a revitalization of regionalism driven by Lula, Petro and Boric, all in power at the same time. What is sure, is that regional dialogue will benefit from this and might improve from the all-time lows it reached during the last years. The crisis of regional integration mechanisms such as CELAC, which Bolsonaro boycotted with his refusals to participate, and Mercosur are too deep to be overcome quickly, but a change in rhetoric and vision is the first step needed.

Lula’s future approach to foreign policy

Recently much attention has been given to a theoretical concept describing a viable foreign policy approach for Latin America for the next century, that of “active non-alignment”. The concept makes the case for a renewed exclusive focus on the region’s interest and neutral positioning with regards to the global competition between China and the US. The idea per-se is nothing fundamentally new, but its saliency is marked by the aggravation of the China-US competition and the need for Latin America to advance its own development agenda, with the support of both superpowers at the same time. Lula might make this concept his own, as his recent words on the war in Ukraine demonstrate. “Zelensky is as responsible as Putin for the war”, the Brazilian leader declared, signalling once again his equidistance from both parts of the conflict and his typical neutrality.

What is most probable is that Lula will apply the same tactic if he wins the presidency again, trying to cooperate with the US on issues such as climate change and democracy-building but without neglecting the trade and financial benefits he might receive from China. At the same time, Lula will also work on revitalizing regional cooperation, though the obstacles might be too high to be surpassed in one term.

The foreign policy of Bolsonaro in the context of the coming elections

La Redazione

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18 October 2022

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The foreign policy of Bolsonaro in the context of the coming elections

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The institutional breakdown could hamper the possibility of Brazil to cooperate internationally with the region and beyond on key areas such as climate change, trade security and democracy-building

Inserted in a complicated international and regional context, the elections of Brazil, Latin America’s most populous country, assume an even greater importance. The phenomenon of democratic erosion is now well established at a global level, but particularly in Latin America according to the main relevant indexes on democracy such as that of Economist and International IDEA. In facts, only 2% of the region’s population live in a “full democracy”, that of Costa Rica and Uruguay, while the rest has to deal with the consequences of living under “flawed democracies” that don’t fully guarantee political and civil rights.

Furthermore, an inflation process that started after the war in Ukraine has now spread to every country in the region. In these circumstances, the fate of Brazil and the influence it exerts on the other Latin American states is even more under scrutiny. A possible institutional breakdown might be on the horizon, as underlined by Brian Winter of Americas Quarterly, and this is no good news for Brazil’s democratic institutions and for the region as a whole.

Bolsonaro’s inactivity

Brazil has a long and important diplomatic tradition that in the past has positioned the country as an undiscussed regional leader. This is paired with long-standing foreign policy ambitions such as that of obtaining a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations or with the tradition of speaking first at the yearly UN General Assembly in New York, which recently took place. The last UNGA provides a perfect example of Bolsonaro’s disinterest in external affairs and incapacity to forge a clear and established foreign policy path. His speech, in fact, was directed almost exclusively to a domestic public, given that the elections were the main topic discussed and the way he instrumentalized his position of power from the UN podium to mobilize internal consensus.

Regional politics

Concerning regional politics, things don’t differ much. Bolsonaro has had his hands full with domestic challenges such as maintaining firm his support from the agro-businesses elites or the evangelic churches and passing pieces of legislation like the signing of a decree that eases gun ownership rules. The consequences of the pandemic and the internal accusations he faces following his disastrous mishandling of the pandemic, which led to 687k deaths so far, contributed to making domestic policy a priority over foreign affairs. Poor coordination with the rest of regional leaders on vaccine distribution (not exclusively Bolsonaro’s fault, but more a sign of the deep crisis of Latin American regionalism) and the absence of regional dialogue are further elements to add to the discussion. In the case of Bolsonaro, his silence on Uruguay’s study of impact of a trade agreement with China that would potentially jeopardize the stability of MERCOSUR is striking.

Bolsonaro and the US, from Trump to Biden

The bilateral relation between the US and Brazil has rarely been so frosty as it is lately. The personal appreciation that Bolsonaro had for Trump, and vice-versa, were the key to a cordial relation between the two presidents that was based on leaving each other’s alone. With the election of Biden, the state of the relation was reversed. “I strongly endorse Bolsonaro, so go out and vote for him” was the endorsement that Donald Trump directed to all the Brazilians on Oct 2^nd, after having previously declared that “Bolsonaro has done a great job for the wonderful people of Brazil”.

On the other hand, Bolsonaro was one of the last heads of state, together with López Obrador of Mexico and Putin of Russia, to recognize the election of Biden as a president of the US with more than a month of delay. From then on, the relationship has been rather conflictual. At the IX Summit of the Americas held last June in Los Angeles, Bolsonaro finally decided to attend, but only after months of uncertainty and the real possibility for him to join the club of boycotting countries that didn’t participate in the hemispheric meeting. On the sidelines of the event, the first and only bilateral meeting between Bolsonaro and Biden was held, but no meaningful initiative of cooperation was launched.

To further complicate the situation, Bolsonaro travelled to Russia in February just before the start of the war in Ukraine. There, he declared “we are in solidarity with Russia. We very much want to collaborate in many areas — defence, oil and gas, agriculture” and that Putin is a “person that strives for peace”. This is a clear obstacle for the bilateral relation with the US and adds up to a lack of common interests that could be the base for a meaningful cooperation given the huge unexploited potential of the diplomatic channels already established between the two countries in areas such as trade, the environment and security.

Brazil and the EU: the state of the strategic partnership and the war

Beyond regional borders, another interesting aspect to point out is the state of the relations between the European Union and Brazil, defined as a “strategic partnership” from 2007. Arguably the biggest success of Bolsonaro’s foreign policy has taken place in this field, with the signing in 2019 of the EU-Mercosur agreement. The signing, and not yet ratification, of this agreement was a huge step in a long process that started more than 25 years ago. The predecessor of Bolsonaro, Michel Temer, had already re-vitalized the agreement that had been stalling for a while, but the final key momentum for the signing of the agreement was provided for by Ernesto Araújo, Brazil’s former foreign minister. Despite this accomplishment, the relation with the EU has generally been conflictual, once again given Bolsonaro’s ties with Putin and his limited availability to cooperate on deforestation and climate change.

A problematic election

On October 30^th, all the eyes will be pointed on Brazil, from Latin America but also from the rest of the world. Whoever wins, the main risk is that of an institutional breakdown that could degenerate in limited street violence and would further hamper the possibility of Brazil to cooperate internationally with the region and beyond on key areas such as climate change, trade security and democracy-building.

Chile’s “rechazo”: the reasons behind it and the consequences for Boric

La Redazione

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26 September 2022

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Chile’s “rechazo”: the reasons behind it and the consequences for Boric

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The document submitted for popular referendum on September 4^th has proven to be too radical. Chileans want change, but they want a more moderate one than that proposed by the new constitution

After an intense constituent moment, Chile said no. The text that came out from the Constituent Assembly, elected in May 2021, was rejected with a striking 61.9% of the votes. The participation rate was impressive as the result itself, around 86%, facilitated by the mandatory status of the vote. Though shorter compared to other constitutional processes in the region, many things have changed in the country during the last two years. The “rechazo” of the proposed constitution marks the end of an important phase, but not necessarily of the whole process.

The causes of the rejection

Chileans want change, as demonstrated by the 78% vote in favor of a new constitution during the first referendum of 2020. But they want a more moderate one than that proposed by the new constitution. In fact, the document submitted for popular referendum on September 4^th has proven to be too radical. The text represented an institutionalization of the social demands that came out of the 2019 protests, which still represent an important part of the popular will for change. Yet, the constitution seems to have gone beyond those for most of the population.

According to a recent survey by Candem, the main public opinion investigation firm in Chile, there are different reasons behind the “rechazo”. At first, the discontent with the formation of the Assembly, in particular with some of its members, which helped fueling the campaign against the constitution that depicted the process as “not serious enough”. Among these, the personal story of Rodrigo Rojas Vade, an activist that became popular in 2019 by denouncing the high costs of cancer treatments in Chile’s health systems he had to pay and then admitting he was lying after an investigation from La Tercera.

Secondly, 35% of the people who rejected the document did so due to the topic of plurinationalism and indigenous representation. The conflict between the State and the indigenous peoples, with the Mapuche being the most prominent one, is an open wound in the country’s past and present. The seats reserved to indigenous representatives in the Assembly (and the presidency of Elisa Loncón, of Mapuche origin, during the first half of the process) together with the articles related to indigenous autonomy tried to reconciliate the parties of the conflict. But the result produced was quite the opposite since some of these changes were perceived as too extreme. The list of reasons for the “no” continues with the “political and economic uncertainty” caused by the new text, restrictions on private property, health and education, and for the changes on the political system.

The elements of continuity

Although much has to be started from scratch, such as the new assembly and constitutional text, there are some elements of continuity that will pervade the next steps of the process. The gender parity clause of the Assembly (formed by 50% of male and 50% of female representatives) is still shared by 77% of Chileans. This, together with the fact that the article on abortion and on other instances brought forward by the feminist movements in the country were only the 8^th reason for rejection, indicates that a new awareness is present in a good share of the population.

57% of the population also agrees on the fact that some seats have to be reserved to indigenous representatives, but less than what they were saved this time, and based on a proportional share of indigenous on the total population. Additional elements of continuity will be derived from the main reasons of the “apruebo”, those who votes yes, which comprehend social and health rights, changes to environmental protection laws and structural changes in the country’s economic and political system. Even if this text was rejected, these instances cannot be ignored anymore. Without a doubt, this new awareness will continue influencing the next phases and the final constitutional document.

The influence of the “rechazo” on Boric’s government

The consequences of this rejection on Boric’s government have already manifested themselves through a painful reshuffling of his cabinet. Izkia Siches, now former interior minister and one of Boric’s most loyal allies, was the biggest name to leave, among other relevant removals. At the same time, the approval rating of the young Chilean president has dropped slightly after the referendum, going from around 38% to 33%, reaching its lowest point on the record. Now, new consensus has to be gathered in order to start a new process and form a new assembly, but this won’t be easy considering the opposition of those who suggest waiting or just reforming the 1980 dictatorial constitution, mainly from the center-right and right of the political spectrum.

In 2019, much effort was needed to get to the “Agreement for Social Peace and the New Constitution”, the compromise among political parties that allowed the whole process to start. After the failure of this first attempt at writing the new constitutional document, it will be complicated to mobilize the people and political parties once again.

Nevertheless, approving a new constitution remains the top priority on Boric’s agenda, as witnessed by his recent speech at the 77^th UNGA in New York, where he said that “very soon, Chile will have a constitution that will satisfy us and make us proud”.

The constitution represents a double-edged sword for Boric. If successful in passing a document that produces shared consensus, it can become for him a way to re-gain approval and to link his name to what will be an historic moment for the country. Consequently, the president will also be able to pass new reforms in the framework of a more progressive constitution that can help him guide the new laws on Chile’s welfare state, the environment and inclusion policies. On the contrary, if Boric fails once again, it will represent a potentially lethal failure for his government. Given the magnitude of the task, it will drain most of the president’s focus and efforts in the next year or so. Not delivering on a document would mean that all this time was lost for nothing.

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