Towards a new European foreign policy

If Brussels is at the wheel, then it must drive.

When this article hits newsstands Europe will have just named its new foreign policy chief, who will have to erase the insignificant interpretation of the role performed by a bland Lady Ashton.

One of the leading contenders is Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini, which is news in itself. That a serving minister from one of the founding European Union nations should stand for one of the top European posts – and also encounter so much resistance – is a sign that times are changing. It is now patently clear to everyone in Europe that all foreign policy decisions of any import are either taken in Brussels or are irrelevant.

Ukraine is a case in point: while delicate relations with Kiev were absent-mindedly left in the hands of the Baltic States and Poland (or even an Angela Merkel arriving late in the game!), we were edging towards a world war. In spite of her lack of charisma, once Lady Ashton finally sat down at the negotiating table in Geneva to represent the EU, plans for future peace, however difficult to implement, were quickly agreed.

Let’s examine the main steps that led to the establishment of a common foreign policy in Europe, so we can have a better idea of its evolution.

The 2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced two major institutional innovations with major repercussions for the EU’s external actions. The first was to turn the Presidency of the European Council into a stable, full time role and the second was the instigation of the new position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, both essentially five year appointments.

In 2009, the European Council appointed Lady Catherine Ashton as High Representative, a role that involves chairing the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council too. The High Representative is assisted by the External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic corps that came into being at the start of 2011.

EEAS staff – drawn from personnel of the European Commission (EC), the Council’s General Secretariat and the diplomatic services of EU Member States – support the High Representative in the execution of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the by no means secondary role of Commission Vice-President.

The EEAS also supports the diplomatic services of individual EU Member States to ensure the consistency of European external actions, developing and implementing the programmes and financial instruments at its disposal. It has 140 delegations worldwide, with just under 3,500 staff (almost 1,500 in Brussels and close to 2,000 overseas), for an annual cost of around €500 million.

The next twelve months are going to be hyper- charged for EU foreign policy. Russia, Ukraine, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Afghanistan, Turkey and transatlantic trade all loom large on an agenda we will forced to manage on our own, given the absence of the US from the Mediterranean and European scenario. Additional complications could emerge in tension-ridden Africa and even in Asia.

The chances of the EU being a relevant and reliable player in these theatres will also depend on the staying power of the fragile relationship between the Member States and the EU’s Brussels- based foreign policy service.

But what should Member States do to enhance the trust and effectiveness of the EEAS?

First and foremost, EU leaders should give the service’s top job to a fearless, experienced, entrepreneurial and recognised foreign policy practitioner. The High Representative should be given the kind of political support that necessarily involves a transfer of authority, which would also send a strong political message about the willingness to handle foreign policy issues on a pan-European basis.

Secondly, Member States should send their best people to EEAS and start closing their embassies in ‘non-core’ countries, delegating their representation to Brussels and concentrating their efforts on those few countries with which they have long-standing and crucial historical, economic and cultural ties.

Thirdly, the EEAS must be allocated sufficient funds to finance the abovementioned hand-over of authority.

Overall, this will lead to a significant rationalisation of national expenditure. Lastly, the new High Representative should expect a strong and clear mandate to invigorate their additional role as head of the European Defence Agency.

None of these empowering measures would require treaty changes or additional costs. In return, we would finally have a foreign policy able to exploit the fact that it represents the world’s number one economic power, one that still provides a social and development model of reference, particularly after having learnt so many lessons during the crisis.