The leading actors in the failed coup are Erdogan, the coup leaders, but most of all the Turkish civil society that wouldn’t be cheated of their democratic prerogatives.
The first thing to know about the coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July is that it is a blessing that it failed.
Had the coup succeeded, Turkey would have started down an unknown path, with months of bloodshed and a civil strife. In spite of concerns about the massive crackdown in the post-coup period and the draconian aspects of Turkey’s newly-imposed state of emergency, the majority of Turks believe that an actual coup would have been a much worse catastrophe.
And they are not wrong.
It has now been revealed that in the dramatic events of the night of Friday, 15 July, the coup attempt was botched when the plotters failed to capture the Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan on the Mediterranean coast in the hotel in which he had been vacationing with his family. Erdogan had left less than an hour before. Had the commando raid on the hotel succeeded in arresting or killing him, the entire story would have unfolded differently. But Erdogan was tipped off about unusual activity among the military cadets that evening. He fled the hotel and, using the Facetime app, called on his supporters to take to the streets and resist the coup. His message went viral via texting and Twitter. Supporters flocked to the Istanbul airport, the Bosphorus bridge and other key locations. Faced with a determined crowd and a well-equipped police force, the coupists surrendered in the early hours of the next morning.
It was an amazing turn of events: a 1970’s-style junta was reversed by the media tools of 2016.
Nevertheless, what lies ahead for Turkey will largely be determined by how it handles the post-coup period and the return to democracy.
The core organizers of the junta are reported to have been clandestine followers of the US-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom successive Turkish governments have accused of fostering sleeper cells within the military, judiciary and bureaucracy. The level of Gulenist penetration has been enough to paralyze Turkish armed forces for years to come. Investigations have revealed a coup-network that included hundreds of officers and roughly a third of the generals within the Turkish armed forces as well as high-level decision makers in the army, support staff, the office manager of Turkey’s chief of staff, Hulusi Akar, his aide-de-camp, the personal assistants of the four-star generals who head Turkey’s Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie as well as Erdogan’s own military liaison officers.
Since the coup, Turkish and Western media narratives have diverged. The European and US public are focused on the post-coup crackdown, while Turkish media almost exclusively report on the Gulen network. Naturally, with the existence of a clandestine network so secretive that it could evade detection for decades, it is very difficult for European and Western audiences to fully understand the multiple layers of identity politics involved.
Also confusing is the fact that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Gulen movement were once allies. The Gulenists provided many of the “human resources” for the conservative AKP during its first decade in power (2002-2012) and were instrumental in widespread purges against secularists within the military from 2009-2013. These trials were lauded by the EU for reducing the military influence in Turkish politics, but they also introduced a significant degree of manipulation into the judicial system and altered the command structure of the military on all levels, allowing Gulenists to rise to prominent positions. It was only in 2013 that a fallout between the AKP and the Gulen group erupted into public view, with Erdogan accusing Gulen supporters of trying to orchestrate his downfall through a string of corruption investigations. Since then, Gulenists were either fired or went underground.
Moving on, Turkey has several challenges in the management of the post-coup period that will likely impact its long-term domestic evolution and relations with the West.
The first challenge will be maintaining the rule-of law and acceptable international norms in the post-coup crackdown. So far, Ankara’s instinct has been maximalist: the dismissal of over 60,000 state employees, ranging from teachers to government auditors and judges. While the purges appear to be directed at Gulen’s followers, Turkey’s Western partners are urging restraint and caution in separating coup-plotters from innocent citizens who may feel a loyalty to Gulen’s teachings.
Ankara’s second challenge will be to rebuild relations with Washington. The 75-year-old cleric Gulen has been living in a remote compound in rural Pennsylvania, and Turkey has requested his extradition. The US regards the issue as a legal matter requiring time and due process. But it is an existential matter for Ankara, and a refusal to extradite would be regarded as tacit support for the coup. Also straining the relationship is the deep suspicion in Ankara that the US knew about the coup and did not notify the Turkish government, based on the fact that some of the fighter jets involved in the coup attempt used a joint US-Turkish air base for refueling. There is already talk of “pivoting to Russia”, and Erdogan will make his first post-coup trip abroad to meet with Vladimir Putin.
In this tumultuous time, Europe can help bring Turkey back into the Transatlantic alliance and build trust on both sides. Turkey’s EU accession process may be dysfunctional, but it is not dead. Visits, contacts and platforms for dialogue will be highly significant in the coming months.
The one silver lining is the determination in Turkish society to resist an anti-democratic intervention. While those that heeded President Erdogan’s call on the night of 15 July were mostly AKP supporters, Turkey’s secularists, Kurds and other opposition parties have also unequivocally voiced opposition to the coup from the beginning. This has resulted in a feeling of unity that Turks have not witnessed in years. Erdogan’s invitation to the opposition parties to visit the palace and a joint democracy rally between the ruling party and the main opposition CHP have led many Turks to breathe a sigh of relief.
There is talk of major reform within the armed forces, state bureaucracies and the judiciary, with key parties collaborating on reform packages in the parliament. There is also now a widespread understanding that bureaucratic appointments should not be based on religiosity, party affiliation or nepotism, but solely on merit. Two weeks after the coup attempt, public sentiment is already (cautiously) optimistic.
This may be one of the biggest gains from an otherwise tragic set of events. Turkey may be bruised, but it is more determined than ever to get back on its feet.
The leading actors in the failed coup are Erdogan, the coup leaders, but most of all the Turkish civil society that wouldn’t be cheated of their democratic prerogatives.
